To investigate the current status of hospital clinical ethics committees (CEC) and how they have evolved in Canada over the past 20 years, this paper presents an overview of the findings from a 2008 survey and compares these findings with two previous Canadian surveys conducted in 1989 and 1984. All Canadian hospitals over 100 beds, of which at least some were acute care, were surveyed to determine the structure of CEC, how they function, the perceived achievements of these committees and opinions about areas with which CEC should be involved. The percentage of hospitals with CEC in our sample was found to be 85% compared with 58% and 18% in 1989 and 1984, respectively. The wide variation in the size of committees and the composition of their membership has continued. Meetings of CEC have become more regularised and formalised over time. CEC continue to be predominately advisory in their nature, and by 2008 there was a shift in the priority of the activities of CEC to meeting ethics education needs and providing counselling and support with less emphasis on advising about policy and procedures. More research is needed on how best to define what the scope of activities of CEC should be in order to meet the needs of hospitals in Canada and elsewhere. More research also is needed on the actual outcomes to patients, families, health professionals and organisations from the work of these committees in order to support the considerable time committee members devote to this endeavour.

In this paper we argue that the responsibility for systematic community-based preventive medicine should not be made part of the role of the general practitioner (GP). Preventive medicine cannot be shown to be more effective than curative or supportive medicine. Therefore, the allocation of the large amount of general practice staff time and resources required for systematic preventive medicine should not come at the expense of the care of the sick and the suffering. The traditional healing role of the GP requires a cooperative patient-centred approach, whereas systematic preventive medicine is driven by rigid pre-set protocols and is intrinsically paternalistic. Trying to merge the two approaches is detrimental to the doctor-patient relationship. Furthermore, a number of potential pitfalls are identified that may be encountered in the implementation of preventive medicine programmes in general practice: interference with the course of the consultation; inadequate explanation and consent; distortion of practice priorities as reflected in quality indicators; temptation to record inaccurate data; conflict of interests where the doctor is rewarded for performance; patient blaming; exacerbation of the health gap.

We suggest that a more justifiable strategy would be for GPs to identify patients at high risk and offer them specific preventive advice when the opportunity presents itself and at a time when the patient is likely to be most amenable to cooperate. Opportunistic health promotion offers higher expectations of benefit, as well as a more equitable allocation of the risks associated with preventive medicine, than a systematic community-based approach.

To investigate risk perception relating to living kidney donation, to compare the risk donors would accept with current practice and identify influential factors.

An observational study consisting of questionnaires completed by previous living donors and the general public. Participants selected the risk they would accept from a list of options, in various scenarios. Risk communication was investigated by randomly dividing the sample and presenting risk differently.

Primary care (two centres) and secondary care (one centre), London.

175 questionnaires were sent to patients who had previously undergone living-donor nephrectomy and to members of the public consulting a general practitioner. The living-donor sample comprised 77 consecutive donors at Guy's Hospital from May 2003 to January 2005. The general-public sample was recruited from two London healthcare centres. Of the eventual 151 participants, 61 were living donors and 90 were from the general public.

The amount of risk a participant would accept to donate a kidney.

74% of participants were willing to accept a risk of death higher than 1/3000. The most commonly accepted risk was 1/2 (29%). Those presented with a ‘chance of survival’ accepted higher risks than those presented with a ‘risk of death’ (p<0.01). Greater risks were accepted when the recipient was closely related and, for some, when the recipient's prognosis was worse. No difference was observed between the living-donor and general-public groups.

Kidney donors will accept a higher risk of death than is currently quoted, especially if risks are presented in terms of chance of survival.

Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement (those involving genetic engineering or pharmaceuticals) present a serious threat to humanity, since the fruits of such enhancement, accelerated scientific progress, will give the morally corrupt minority of humanity new and more effective ways to cause great harm. And yet it is scientific progress, accelerated by non-traditional cognitive enhancement, which could allow us to dramatically morally enhance human beings, thereby eliminating, or at least reducing, the threat from the morally corrupt minority. I argue that this apparently intractable dilemma is less difficult to resolve than Persson and Savulescu suppose. Their analysis of non-traditional cognitive enhancement overstates the risks and undervalues the benefits that such enhancement might provide. Once the benefits are better described, it is clear that non-traditional cognitive enhancement could be the means of our survival, not of our destruction.

The public discourse surrounding sex and severe disability over the past 40 years has largely focused on protecting vulnerable populations from abuse. However, health professionals and activists are increasingly recognising the inherent sexuality of disabled persons and attempting to find ways to accommodate their intimacy needs. This essay explores several ethical issues arising from such efforts.

Autonomy, an individual's right to make personal decisions regarding his/her own health, represents one of the major ethical principles of medicine. While there are many examples citing the benefits this right provides for the individual, the impact that personal healthcare decisions have on others is often neglected. Here, evidence from end-stage renal disease is reviewed to hypothesise the creation of a universal kidney donation programme that although provides unparalleled benefits to its citizens, relies on the participation of a large proportion of the society. Given that this essay also addresses the public's major concerns regarding kidney donation, one of the only remaining implementation barriers is the individuals' right not to participate. Therefore, irrespective of the humane and complex emotionally laden reasons for not enrolling in such programmes, this essay provides some estimates of the significant resource and quality of life costs associated with autonomy. Assuming humans are competent to make informed personal healthcare choices, similar to recent efforts to increase awareness about the negative impact of certain lifestyle choices on global warming, citizens should also be better informed about the medical costs their autonomy has on society.

In her 2003 article in the British Medical Journal, Ruth Macklin provocatively declared dignity to be a useless concept: either a vague restatement of other more precise values, such as autonomy or respect for persons, or an empty slogan. A recent response to Macklin has challenged this claim. Doris Schroeder attempts to rescue dignity by positing four distinct concepts that fall under the one umbrella term. She argues that much of the confusion surrounding dignity is due to the lack of disambiguation among these four concepts, but that once we understand the different values in question dignity becomes a powerful tool in the fields of human rights and bioethics. It is the goal of this paper to build upon Schroeder's insights by reconnecting the multiple strands of dignity she identifies. It will be argued that the usefulness of dignity as a guiding principle in medical ethics can be much improved by identifying the single conceptual link that ties together the various values flying under its banner. That conceptual link is provided by understanding dignity as the capacity to live by one's standards and principles.

Criticisms of the ethical justification of antidoping legislation are not uncommon in the literatures of medical ethics, sports ethics and sports medicine. Critics of antidoping point to inconsistencies of principle in the application of legislation and the unjustifiability of ethical postures enshrined in the World Anti-Doping Code, a new version of which came into effect in January 2009. This article explores the arguments concerning the apparent legal peculiarities of antidoping legislation and their ethically salient features in terms of: notions of culpability, liability and guilt; aspects of potential duplication of punishments and the limitations of athlete privacy in antidoping practice and policy. It is noted that tensions still exist between legal and ethical principles and norms that require further critical attention.

The Mental Health Act 2007 introduced Deprivation of Liberty safeguards into the Mental Capacity Act 2005 with potentially far reaching resource implications. There appears to be no scientific data regarding the prevalence of deprivation of liberty in clinical settings such as hospitals and nursing homes. We examined how many patients across a whole Trust area in Wales were subject to some lack of capacity, how well documented this was and how many were potentially deprived of their liberty. We found that no patient was deprived of their liberty, but 8% lacked capacity to make either basic or complex decisions; another 5% lacked capacity to make complex decisions. Documentation was good in mental health and community directorates, but there were gaps in documentation (not practice) in the medical and surgical directorates. Routine collection of data improved documentation regarding deprivation of liberty criteria. There is a high likelihood that senior nursing staff underestimate the number of patients who lack capacity.

In Switzerland, right-to-die organisations assist their members with suicide by lethal drugs, usually barbiturates. One organisation, Dignitas, has experimented with oxygen deprivation as an alternative to sodium pentobarbital.

To analyse the process of assisted suicide by oxygen deprivation with helium and a common face mask and reservoir bag.

This study examined four cases of assisted suicide by oxygen deprivation using helium delivered via a face mask. Videos of the deaths were provided by the Zurich police. Dignitas provided protocol and consent information.

One man and three women were assisted to death by oxygen deprivation. There was wide variation in the time to unconsciousness and the time to death, probably due to the poor mask fit. Swiss law prevented attendants from effectively managing the face mask apparatus. Purposeless movements of the extremities were disconcerting for Dignitas attendants, who are accustomed to assisting suicide with barbiturates. None of the dying individuals attempted self-rescue.

The dying process of oxygen deprivation with helium is potentially quick and appears painless. It also bypasses the prescribing role of physicians, effectively demedicalising assisted suicide. Oxygen deprivation with a face mask is not acceptable because leaks are difficult to control and it may not eliminate rebreathing. These factors will extend time to unconsciousness and time to death. A hood method could reduce the problem of mask fit. With a hood, a flow rate of helium sufficient to provide continuous washout of expired gases would remedy problems observed with the mask.

This article tackles the current deficit in the supply of cadaveric organs by addressing the family veto in organ donation. The authors believe that the family veto matters—ethically as well as practically—and that policies that completely disregard the views of the family in this decision are likely to be counterproductive. Instead, this paper proposes to engage directly with the most important reasons why families often object to the removal of the organs of a loved one who has signed up to the donor registry—notably a failure to understand fully and deliberate on the information and a reluctance to deal with this sort of decision at an emotionally distressing time. To accommodate these concerns it is proposed to separate radically the process of information, deliberation and agreement about the harvesting of a potential donor's organs from the event of death and bereavement through a scheme of advance commitment. This paper briefly sets out the proposal and discusses in some detail its design as well as what is believed to be the main advantages compared with the leading alternatives.

Quality improvement (QI) is fundamental to maintaining high standards of health care. Significant debate exists concerning the necessity for an ethical approval system for those QI projects that push the boundaries, appearing more similar to research than QI. The authors discuss this issue identifying the core ethical issues in family medicine (FM), drawing upon the fundamental principles of medical ethics, including principles of autonomy, utility, justice and non-maleficence. Recent debate concerning the application of QI ethics boards is discussed with relevance to primary care and issues such as general practitioner (GP) intentions, the impact of QI on patients and the use of confidential patient data and the impact of dissemination. The authors conclude that a system of QI ethical approval leaves many issues unresolved and potentially creates several barriers to implementing QI. To ensure ethical QI work is generated within FM it is essential for GPs to learn about and engage in more ethical reflection so that they can better judge and resolve these issues.